| In order to provide
a guide for Mexican companies to improve the way their administrative
bodies function, and a way for investors to gain access to more
information on how they are run, on June 9, 1999, a group of
leading Mexican business organizations presented a new Corporate
Governance Code for Mexico.
The document was prepared jointly by the Mexican Stock Exchange,
the Mexican Bankers' Association, the Mexican Institute of
Finance Executives and the Mexican Institute of Public Accountants,
as well as representatives from the industrial, retail and
service sectors. It was then submitted to the National Banking
and Securities Commission so that the securities authorities
could issue the necessary regulatory provisions on disclosure
of information regarding conformity to the practices suggested
therein.
The recommendations contained in the Code do not in any way
conflict with current legislation; in fact, they complement
many of the applicable legal provisions. They can be applied
to any Mexican company, whether listed on the stock exchange
or not. Compliance is voluntary, but publicly-traded firms
must report to the Bolsa on the degree to which their practices
conform to the Code. If they do not follow the Code, they
must establish an alternative mechanism for this purpose.
The Corporate Governance Code for Mexico is the first of
its kind in Latin America. It has its root in the abiding
interest expressed by various sectors of the economy, in the
ability of Mexican companies attain international standards
and to be more competitive. Its purpose is to encourage more
transparent management practices in order to enhance the confidence
of local and foreign investors and thus attract more investment
to benefit the Mexican economy.
To create the Code, representatives from the private sector
and the government formed a committe. Their first task was
to analyze international experiences in the field before they
began the work of actually drafting the text of the code.
In this phase of the project they examined the experiences
of England, Spain, France, Holland, Canada and South Africa,
among other countries.
At the same time, committee members were attentive to the
need to formulate their recommendations in keeping with the
practices a Mexican corporation must follow, consistent with
this country's economic and social reality. They also recognized
the need to create principles not covered by the ordinances
of other countries.
For example, the capital structure of a Mexican corporation
is clearly different from that of other countries. In various
developed countries, corporate capital is fragmented and held
by major institutional investors, whereas in publicly traded
Mexican companies, most of the capital is held by control
shareholders, which gives them a preponderant role in the
company's management.
Another key part of the Code establishes recommendations
regarding the operation and makeup of Boards of Directors.
Here, the Code recommends some specific and some functional
aspects.
With regard to the specific recommendations, the Code stresses
that they provide a recommendable standard for companies in
general, but that each company must make its own decisions
on how it will comply with these points.
On the subject of functional recommendations, the Committee
proposes setting up intermediate bodies or committees below
the level of the Board of Directors, to act as an intermediary
that can support the Board in its functions and enhance its
decision-making capacities.
The Corporate Governance Code for Mexico consists of five
sections::
Board of Directors. Includes recommendations on the functions,
makeup, structure, operation and duties of the Board.
Evaluating and Compensating Directors. To allow company management
to function more efficiently.
Auditing. Selection of auditors or examiners, verification
of financial information, internal controls and compliance
with applicable legal provisions in this area.
Finances and Planning. Suggestions and operating aspects.
Stockholder information. Aspects covered in the agenda of
stockholders' meetings, quality and promptness of information,
and communication between the Board of Directors and investors.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE FOR MEXICO
Background and Objectives
In order for investors to feel complete confidence in the
way a company is run, that company must make its management
processes as clear and above-board as possible, and encourage
an appropriate level of information and disclosure.
Aware of this need, various sectors of the Mexican economy
have expressed an interest in encouraging local companies
to attain international standard and to become more competitive,
applying more transparent management practices in order to
enhance the confidence of local and foreign investors and
thus attract more investment to benefit the Mexican economy.
To this end, a Committee on Corporate Governance was formed
of representatives of industry, the government, the financial
world, and service providers, among others.
The Committee's first task was to analyze international experiences
involving mechanisms that had been used successfully to clearly
communicate information about company management. It found
that the most widely used and appropriate method to achieve
this purpose was the Corporate Governance Code, which is used
to establish principles that would create a greater harmony
among the various participants in a company, thus enhancing
its corporate governance.
The Committee then set about drafting a Corporate Governance
Code for Mexico. This Code establishes voluntary recommendations
to improve the corporate management of Mexican companies.
Its recommendations do not conflict with any current legislation,
but rather complement many of the applicable legal provisions.
The recommendations were formulated in keeping with the practices
a Mexican corporation must follow, consistent with this country's
economic and social reality. They also recognize the need
to create principles not covered by the ordinances of other
countries.
On the subject of functional recommendations, the Committee
proposes setting up intermediate bodies below the level of
the Board of Directors, to act as an intermediary that can
support the Board in its functions and allow it to make better
informed decisions.
The code can be applied to any Mexican company, whether listed
on the stock exchange or not, although there are certain principles
that apply solely to publicly traded companies because of
their unique characteristics. Finally, in an effort to encourage
an increased flow of information to the market, the Committee
asked the National Banking and Securities Commission to issue
provisions requiring companies that list stock on the Mexican
exchange to reveal the extent to which they follow the suggested
practices.
Introduction
At the initiative of the Business Coordinating Council, a
Committee on Corporate Governance was created, which in turn
drafted and issued this Corporate Governance Code, establishing
recommendations to improve the corporate governance of Mexican
companies.
The recommendations contained in the Code define basic principles
to help Board of Directors function better and improve the
flow of information to stockholders. Specifically, the recommendations
seek: (i) to encourage companies to increase the amount of
information regarding their management structure and the function
of their corporate bodies; (ii) to suggest mechanisms by which
companies can ensure that their financial information is sufficient;
(iii) to establish processes that encourage participation
and communication among board members; (iv) to encourage companies
to develop mechanism that encourage a proper level of disclosure
to stockholders. These principles are found throughout the
Code and are indicated in boldface type, and preceded by a
bullet. The rest of the text of the Code offers a brief explanation
and context for each principle.
In drafting the Code, the Committee recognized the specific
reality and needs of Mexican companies. Among these was their
stock structure and the important role stockholders may play
in their management.
Finally, readers should note that the code can be applied
to any Mexican company, whether listed on the stock exchange
or not, although there are certain principles that apply solely
to publicly-traded companies. Listed companies must report
on the degree to which they follow the suggested practices.
If any publicly-traded company does not follow them, it must
indicate its reasons for refraining to do so, and describe
the alternative mechanism it uses in their stead. To facilitate
compliance with the Code's recommendations, subsidiaries may
choose to comply with the Code through their holding companies.
I. Board of Directors
The day to day operation of a company is the responsibility
of its management team. The definition of its strategic vision
and approval of its management should be the responsibility
of the Board of Directors. All the members of the Board share
in the responsibility for these tasks.
To fulfill its purpose, the Code recommends that the Board
include members that are not involved in the daily operation
of the company so they can provide an external, independent
perspective. In order to, facilitate its tasks, the Board
should rely on intermediate bodies whose job it is to evaluate
information and propose tasks in specific areas of importance
to the Board. This will give board members more complete information
for efficient decision-making. Finally, there should be clear
rules regarding the operation and functioning of the Board.
I.1 Functions
Although some of the faculties of the Board of Directors
are dictated by law, the Committee believes that there are
other functions that would help to define its tasks and make
company information more useful, prompt and reliable.
In addition to the obligations stipulated in the General Mercantile
Companies Law, the Credit Institutions Law, the Securities
Market Law and other specific laws, the following should be
included in the functions of the Board of Directors: (i) establish
a strategic vision for the company; (ii) ensure that stockholders
and the market have access to public information about the
company; (iii) establish internal control mechanisms; (iv)
ensure that the company has the necessary mechanisms to prove
that it complies with the various legal provisions to which
it is subject; and (v) regularly evaluate the performance
of the chief executive officer and other senior management
of the company.
I.2 Composition
The composition of the Board of Directors is crucial to its
ability to function properly. The Board should therefore include
at least enough members to offer an adequate range of opinions,
but not so many that members cannot effectively express and
discuss their viewpoints with out provoking inefficient practices
by an excessive number of board members.
The Board of Directors should consist of between 5 and 15
regular members.
It is important to avoid situations in which regular members
who are unable to attend meetings are replaced at random by
any alternate member, because this dilutes his or her obligations
to the rest of the Board. It is also important the regular
member and his or her alternate form a team in order to participate
more effectively in the Board. For this reason, regular members
should participate in the process of selecting their alternates.
There should be no alternate board members; if there are,
they should be assigned to replace only a previously-established
regular member, and each prospective regular board member
should be asked to suggest their alternate.
The makeup of the Board of Directors is also important to
its ability to define a strategic vision of the company and
to support its operations. For this reason, it is important
that the Board include outside members. The term outside member
is used to identify members who are not connected with the
company's management team. These members are called to join
the Board by virtue of their personal and professional prestige.
Their main purpose is to offer an impartial perspective on
the company's strategic planning and other tasks that fall
to the Board.
Outside board members are those selected for their professional
prestige, experience and capacity and who do not fit into
the following hypothetical situations at the time of their
assignments. (i) employees or executives of the company; (ii)
stockholders that have control over the company's directors;
(iii) consultants to the company or partners or employees
of companies that serve in an advisory or consulting capacity
to the company or its affiliates, and whose revenues depend
significantly on this contractual relationship; (iv) clients,
suppliers, lenders or borrowers of the company, or partners
or employees of a firm that is a significant client, supplier,
lender or borrower of the company; (v) employees of a foundation,
university, or non-profit organization that receives substantial
donations from the company; (vi) chief executive officers
or senior management of a firm on whose Board of Directors
the company's chief executive officer or upper-level executive
sits; or (vii) relatives of any of the individuals mentioned
in points (i) to (vi), above.
It is also important that the Board include what are called
owning directors. This type of member has assumed the risk
of a significant participation in the company's equity, and
their presence in the board is helpful because as they keep
a constant watch on their investment, they benefit the entire
company.
Owning directors are selected from among major stockholders
or the individuals that direct them. Depending on whether
the major stockholder or its director qualify to be outside
directors, they can be appointed as outside owning directors
or inside owning directors.
Inside directors are those that do not fall into either of
the previous two described categories.
In order for outside and owning directors to fulfill their
purpose, they must be represented in a sufficient percentage
on the Board.
Outside and owning members should together make up at least
40% of the Board of Directors. And that, outside members should
make up at least 20% of the Board of Directors.
In order for the market to be able to evaluate the makeup
of the Board, the company should provide information on the
background and category of each member.
The annual report presented by the Board of Directors should
mention which members are outside and which are owners, and
which type the owning members are.
The annual report presented by the Board of Directors should
also describe the main positions held by each board member
as of the report date.
I.3 Structure
The Committee believes that there are at least three specific
areas in which the Board of Directors must make key decisions
for the company. These are: evaluation and compensation; auditing;
and finances and planning. The Board therefore should have
access to mechanisms that allow it to make the right decisions
in these areas.
The Committee recommends creating one or more intermediate
bodies to serve as intermediaries that support the functions
of the Board. Structurally, these bodies should be made up
of members; functionally, they should serve as an extension
of the Board, to support it in making decisions on a variety
of issues.
The intermediate bodies should not intervene in company operations.
Thus, to be able to carry out their tasks, they should rely
on the work of the management structure. This means the intermediate
bodies would not be an executive department, nor would they
assume the functions that correspond to the Board itself or
to the operating areas of the company.
In order to make better informed decisions, the Board of Directors
should perform the tasks of evaluation and compensation, auditing,
finances and planning, which are defined later in the Code,
through one or more intermediate bodies.
Although the Committee recognizes that there must be some
flexibility in the organizational structure of different companies,
international experience has shown that committees are a useful
tool for carrying out these specific functions. What is particularly
important is that the Board of Directors make informed decisions
on important issues.
For example, it is considered important that owning and outside
members participate in the work of the intermediate bodies.
The latter because they were selected for their professional
prestige and experience, and the former because they have
the incentive to get involved in and resolve the affairs of
those bodies.
The following principles should be considered when creating
intermediate bodies:
One or more can be created, providing they have a clear purpose
and there is no conflict of interest among their members.
They should be made up solely of regular board members.
They should have between three and seven members.
They should report to the Board of Directors on their activities
on a regular basis.
The chairman of each body may invite company executives whose
duties correspond to the intermediate body's area of concern
to attend meetings.
In addition to his or her duties on the Board, each outside
board member should participate in at least one intermediate
body.
The intermediate body in charge of auditing should be chaired
by an outside board member.
I.4 Operations
The Board should meet frequently enough to ensure proper
and continuous oversight of the company's affairs.
The Board of Directors should meet at least 4 times a year.
One of its meetings should be devoted to defining the company's
medium- and long-term strategy.
It is also important for companies to have mechanisms that
guarantee openness within the Board, so that its functions
do not depend on just one person.
A procedure should be in place under which a Board meeting
can be called by agreement of at least 25% of its members.
The active participation and responsibility of the members
of the Board of Directors makes the Board a stronger institution.
To promote this, it is important that board members are supplied
with information in advance to give them the elements they
need to perform their duties.
Board members should have access to any information relevant
to decisions that are on the meeting agenda at least five
days in advance of that meeting. This does not apply to confidential
strategic matters that are to be discussed, in which cases
there should be mechanisms available by which board members
can proper to assess proposals regarding those strategic matters.
New board members should be given the information necessary
for them to properly perform their duties. They should therefore
have a broad knowledge of the business, including, among other
aspects, the company's position within its sector, its main
competitors, clients and suppliers.
In addition, board members are legally bound to perform their
duties. Ignorance of their responsibilities does not exempt
them from these duties. It is therefore important that new
board members are informed of the scope and the legal and
statutory consequences of their position.
When board members are first appointed, they should be given
proper orientation with regard to their new responsibilities.
At the least, the company should supply them with information
regarding the company and its environment, as well as the
obligations, responsibilities and powers that accompany appointment
to the Board.
I.5 Duties of Board Members
Board members assume obligations and responsibilities when
they accept their appointment. For this reason, it is important
for a company to have a general frame of action that establishes
standards of conduct for its board members.
Companies should address six principles of conduct, recommending
that board members:
Notify the Chairman and the Secretary of the Board of Directors
of any situation that constitutes or could be construed as
a conflict or interest, and refrain from participating in
the corresponding debate.
Use the company's assets and services exclusively in pursuing
its corporate purpose, and define clear policies to apply
in exceptional cases when these assets must be put to personal
use.
Dedicate the necessary time and attention to their job, attending
at least 70 per cent of the meetings that are called (this
point applies only to regular members);
Hold all information that might affect company operations,
as well as the discussions that take place in board meetings,
in utmost confidence.
Board members and their respective alternates, if any, must
be kept mutually informed of the matters discussed in the
board meetings they attend.
Support the Board of Directors with opinions, recommendations,
and directions that are based on an analysis of the company's
performance, so the decisions it makes are duly founded on
professional criteria and qualified personnel who can offer
a broader independent focus on the company's operations.
II. Evaluation and Compensation
The Committee recommends that there be a mechanism to support
the Board in its responsibilities with regard to evaluation
and compensation of the chief executive officer and senior
management of the company. This mechanism may be supported
by the company's internal structure, such as the human resources
area.
The Committee believes that it is essential that the mechanism
chosen involves bringing the proposals to the Board of Directors
so that it can make the appropriate decision. Furthermore,
the existence of this mechanism should be openly known and
operated in an clear and above-board fashion, to enhance investors'
confidence in management.
II.1 General functions
The following functions are intended to supply the company
with appropriate human resource and remuneration policies.
The evaluation and compensation mechanism should encompass
the following functions: (i) suggesting procedures for the
Board of Directors to propose candidates for chief executive
officer and senior management positions; (ii) proposing criteria
for the Board of Directors to evaluate the chief executive
officer and senior management, according to general guidelines
established by the Board of Directors; and (iii) analyze and
bring before the Board of Directors the chief executive officer's
proposal regarding the structure and amount of compensation
for the company's senior management.
II.2 Operating aspects
The mechanism or intermediate body should assist the Board
in evaluating policies to determine compensation for the chief
executive officer and senior management of the company. These
policies should encompass aspects such as established goals,
individual performance, and the performance of the company
itself. The Committee believes that the market at large should
be informed of the compensation policies applied by the Board
of Directors.
To protect the company's equity, the intermediate body should
also help the Board to avoid paying excessive amounts to executives
for severance pay, by carefully reviewing the hiring conditions
of these executives.
The mechanism established for assisting the Board of Directors
in its evaluation and compensation functions should verify
whether the hiring conditions of the chief executive officer
and senior management, as well as any severance pay commitments,
comply with Board-approved guidelines .
The annual report presented by the Board of Directors should
describe the policies used and the compensation packages of
board members, the chief executive officer and the company's
senior management.
III. Auditing
The Committee recommends that there be a mechanism to support
the Board in ensuring that the auditing functions are performed,
ensuring that internal and external audits are performed as
objectively as possible and that the financial information
is useful, timely and reliable. In other words, it should
ensure that the information that reaches the Board of Directors,
stockholders and the general public is transparent, sufficient,
and adequately reflects the company's financial position.
To perform this function, it may make use of the company's
internal structures, such as the internal auditing area and
external auditors.
The Committee believes that the essential point is that whatever
mechanism is chosen, it addresses the functions described
above, and ensures that proposals are brought before the Board
of Directors so that it can make the appropriate decisions.
III.1 General Functions
All the phases of the auditing process, including the work
of the internal auditor, external auditor and statutory auditor,
should be coordinated.
The following are the suggested functions of the auditing
mechanism: (i) recommend prospective external auditors for
the company for Board approval; (ii) recommend contract clauses
and the scope of external auditors' professional responsibilities
for Board approval; (iii) support the Board of Directors in
supervising performance of the auditors' contracts; (iv) serve
as a channel of communication between the Board of Directors
and external auditors, and guarantee the independence and
objectivity of the latter; (v) review the work plan, observation
letters and auditing reports, and notify the Board of Directors
of the results; (vi) recommend bases for the preparation of
financial information for Board approval; (vii) assist the
Board by reviewing the financial information and the process
of reporting it; (viii) help define the general guidelines
for the internal control system, and evaluate its effectiveness;
(ix) assist the Board in coordinating and evaluating annual
internal auditing programs; (x) coordinate the tasks of the
external, internal and statutory auditors; and (xi) check
that the necessary mechanisms are in place in order to prove
that the company is in compliance with the various provisions
to which it is subject.
III.2 Selection of auditors
Two key criteria in the selection process are the technical
capacity and the independence of the auditors. Those making
the selection should also be alert for any circumstances that
might affect the auditor's objectivity, for example when the
auditing firm depends heavily on the company for its revenues.
If the auditors supply other services to the company in addition
to auditing, the nature and extent of these services should
be kept under review, in order to ensure that the auditors'
objectivity is not affected.
No firm that receives more than 20% of its total revenues
from all services supplied to the company should be proposed
to the Board of Directors to perform external auditing of
the company's financial statements, or any other external
review.
The auditors' opinion contributes the perspective of an independent
third party on the reasonableness of the financial statements.
If the person that issues that opinion has been performing
this function for an extended period of time, he or she runs
the risk of losing their objectivity. For this reason, the
Committee believes that it is important for the company to
encourage a turnover in the position in charge of issuing
opinions on its financial statements.
A proposed mechanism of turnover for the partner that issues
the opinion on the company should be presented for Board approval,
in order to ensure objectivity in the reports. Ideally, the
turnover should take place at least every 6 years.
The General Mercantile Companies Law stipulates that the
stockholders of a company must appoint a statutory auditor,
who is responsible, among other aspects, for examining both
the financial statements themselves and the application of
accounting principles. The company's management also commissions
an external auditor to issue an opinion on its financial statements.
Although there is some similarity between the functions of
the statutory and external auditors, those who appoint them
do so for different reasons, which means that making the statutory
auditor also responsible for the external audit would be a
conflict of interest.
The person signing the auditors' opinion on the annual financial
statements should be different from the person who serves
as statutory auditor, although both may be members of the
same firm.
Those selecting the statutory auditor should be sure that
the professional profile of that individual allows him or
her to comply with their legal obligations. The annual report
presented by the Board of Directors should describe their
professional profile.
III.3 Financial Information
The financial information presented by the chief executive
officer to the Board during the fiscal year contains unaudited
figures. To guarantee that the Board makes its decisions on
the basis of reliable information, the mechanism established
to support it in this function may rely on the company's internal
structures in order to be able to issue an opinion on the
processes for validating this information.
Internal auditing provides a support tool to the company's
management that allows it to assess the financial information
generated and the effectiveness of internal controls.
The company should have an internal auditing department.
The Board of Directors should be informed of the general
accounting policies that will be applied in preparing the
financial statements. For those receiving the information,
this guarantees that the company is following the accounting
policies that most closely match their needs.
The accounting policies used to prepare the financial information
of the company should be presented to the Board of Directors
for approval.
Maintaining the same accounting policy ensures that financial
information remains consistent, and makes it easier to make
projections on the company's future. In exceptional cases
when a change in accounting policy is necessary, it should
be announced and explained in advance so that users can evaluate
the impact of the change.
When the Board of Directors is asked to approve changes in
accounting policy, the justification for the change should
be specified.
In order to encourage investor confidence and certainty regarding
company information, it is important to prepare the annual
information on the same bases as those used during the fiscal
year.
The Board of Directors should verify that intermediate financial
information is prepared using the same policies, criteria
and practices with which the annual information is prepared.
In this process, they may rely on the support of external,
internal and statutory auditors.
Mechanisms to guarantee the quality of financial information
presented to the Board of Directors should be presented to
the Board for approval. The internal, external and statutory
auditors of the company may participate in this process.
III.4 Internal Controls
The internal control system is the means by which the Board
ensures that the company operates in a general climate of
control, and that the resolutions passed by the Board are
being properly implemented.
General guidelines for the internal control system should
be submitted to the Board for approval.
It is important for shareholders to be informed of any defined
processes by which the company operates, and to know that
it has an orderly process of management and a satisfactory
control over its assets. Reports issued by external and internal
auditors can provide support in this regard, by verifying
the effectiveness of the control system.
The mechanism designed to support the Board in its auditing
functions should evaluate the effectiveness of the internal
control system an issue an opinion on existing financial and
operational controls.
External auditors should validate the effectiveness of the
internal control system and issue a report on these controls.
III.5 Reviewing Compliance
The Committee believes that it is important for companies
to have a mechanism by which the Board is kept informed of
compliance with applicable laws and provisions.
Information should therefore be generated on a regular basis
regarding all aspects of this area, so that an opinion can
be issued regarding the level of compliance that exists, and
the company's freedom from any legal liability in this respect.
Such a process reduces the possibility of unexpected costs
for the company, and gives the market confidence in the company's
legal status.
Companies should be sure that mechanisms exist to determine
whether they are in due compliance with applicable laws and
provisions. A compliance review should therefore be conducted
at least once a year.
The Board of Directors should be informed regularly of the
company's legal status.
IV. Finances and Planning
The Committee recommends that the Board of Directors have
a support mechanism in the area of finances and planning,
particularly for evaluating the long-term strategy of the
business and its central investment and financing policies.
In performing this function, those responsible may rely on
the company's internal structures, such as the finance department.
The Committee believes it is essential that the mechanism
chosen is responsible for performing these functions, and
ensures that proposals are brought before the Board of Directors
so that it can make the appropriate decisions. The mechanism
should also guarantee that the company's financing and investment
policies are consistent with its strategic vision.
IV.1 General functions
The following functions support the Board in its definition
of policies and strategies.
The support mechanism should perform the following functions:
(i) evaluate, and if necessary suggest investment policies
for the company proposed by the chief executive officer, then
submit them for Board approval; (ii) evaluate, and if necessary
suggest financing policies (equity or debt) for the company
proposed by the chief executive officer, then submit them
for Board approval; (iii) evaluate, and if necessary suggest
general guidelines for strategic planning; (iv) offer opinions
on the assumptions underlying the annual budget and submit
them to the Board for approval; (v) monitor the application
of the budget and the strategic plan; and (vi) identify the
risk factors to which the company is exposed and evaluate
policies for managing that risk.
IV.2 Operating Aspects
To support the Board of Directors in its decisions, it is
important that the finance and planning mechanism offer the
Board opinions on any intended investment or financing transactions.
The priorities and policies established by the Board of Directors
should be taken into account in this task.
An evaluation of the viability of the company's principal
investment and financing transactions, according to the established
policies, should be presented to the Board for approval.
Strategic planning involves not only defining goals but establishing
processes to supervise the strategies and plans that are created
to achieve these goals.
The company's strategic position should be periodically evaluated
against its strategic plan.
There should be a link between the company's investment and
financing policies and its long-term goals. If these policies
are not designed to match the company's strategic vision,
it may not be able to meet its goals. This is why the policies
should be examined for consistency with the company's strategic
vision, and incorporated into the various forms of documentation
the company prepares.
The Board of Directors should be assisted in the task of ensuring
that investment and financing policies are consistent with
the company's strategic vision.
The Board of Directors should be assisted in the task of reviewing
the company's financial projections and their consistency
with the strategic plan.
V. Disclosure of Information to Stockholders
To gain access to funding under optimum conditions, companies
must supply adequate information to the market. The recommendations
below apply to both ordinary and extraordinary stockholders'
meetings.
V.1 Information and Agenda for Stockholders' Meetings
The points contained in the order of the day that is sent
out to stockholders in the stockholders' meeting announcement
should precisely and clearly describe the business to be dealt
with during that meeting. It has become a common practice
to include several topics in one point on the agenda; it is
important, however, that each topic be discussed and analyzed
separately so that resolutions are not passed on as a group
of topics about which stockholders may have different opinions.
The same applies to the category of "miscellaneous business"
often included on the stockholders' meeting agenda.
It is also important for stockholders to have access in advance
to all the information necessary for adequate decision-making
in the stockholders' meeting.
Companies should avoid including the category "miscellaneous
business" on stockholders' meeting agendas, or grouping
together various matters under a single point on the agenda.
Separating out the business to be addressed enables stockholders
to vote on each separate point and to be informed of the subjects
to be addressed at the meeting.
All of the information relative to each point on the stockholders'
meeting agenda should be available at least 15 days before
the meting.
A form should be prepared containing detailed information
and voting choices on the issues contained in the agenda,
through which stockholders may issue proxy instructions on
their voting rights corresponding to each point on the meeting
agenda.
It is important, for example, that stockholders receive all
pertinent information on nominees to the Board of Directors,
which can be contained a brief r閟um? so that they can assess
the candidate's profile and issue an informed vote.
The information delivered to stockholders should include the
proposed members of the Board of Directors as well as a professional
profile on each candidate.
V.2 Information and Communication between the Board of Directors
and Stockholders
The Board is responsible for guaranteeing effective communication
between the company and its stockholders. The purpose of presenting
an annual report at the stockholders' meeting is to show the
company's financial position and comment on any plans and
activities it has carried out in the past or plans for the
future. To enrich the information generated by the company,
stockholders should also have access to information on the
activities of the intermediate bodies.
The Board of Directors should include information on the work
of each intermediate body in it annual report to stockholders.
The reports on each intermediate body which are presented
to the Board should be made available to stockholders along
with the other material for the meeting, with the exception
of confidential information whose disclosure might hurt the
company's competitiveness. The annual report should also include
the names of the members of each intermediate body.
The prevailing lack of stockholder participation in stockholders'
meetings, and the meetings' limitations as a forum of communication
between the company and its investors, reveal the need for
additional efforts to create other means of communication
that allow investors and the general public to obtain the
information they need on the company.
Every company should have policies, mechanisms, and designed
personnel responsible for reporting to investors in order
to keep the lines of communication open with stockholders
and potential investors.
MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez-Colunga
Partner, SAI Consultores, S.C.
Alberto Bailleres Gonz醠ez
Chairman of the Board, Grupo BAL
Eduardo Bours Castelo
Chairman, Business Coordinating Council
Antonio Franck Cabrera
Partner, Franck, Galicia, Duclaud y Robles, S.C.
Dionisio Garza Medina
Chairman of the Board, Grupo ALFA
Antonio G髆ez Espi馿ira
Chairman, Mexican Institute of Public Accountants
Carlos G髆ez y G髆ez
Chairman, Mexican Bankers' Association
Miguel Guzm醤 Villavicencio
Chairman, Mexican Institute of Finance Executives
Rafael Laporta Drago
Professor, Harvard University
Florencio L髉ez de Silanes
Professor, Harvard University
Miguel Mancera Aguayo
Independent professional
Manual Robleda Gonz醠ez de Castilla
Chairman of the Board, Mexican Stock Exchange
Fernando Senderos Mestre
Chairman of the Board, Grupo DESC
Carlos Slim Hel?br> Honorary Chairman of the Board, Grupo
CARSO
COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUESTS
Eduardo Fern醤dez Garc韆
Chairman, National Banking and Securities Commission
Salvi Folch Viadero
Vice Chairman of Securities Market Supervision, National Banking
and Securities Commission
Javier Gavito Mohar
Vice Chairman of Financial Research and Development, National
Banking and Securities Commission
Jes鷖 Marcos Yacam醤
Deputy Governor, Banco de M閤ico
Fernando Salas Vargas
Chief of the Economic Deregulation Unit, Ministry of Trade
and Industrial Development
Mart韓 Werner Wainfeld
Under Secretary of Finance and Public Credit
SECRETARY OF THE COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Guillermo Zamarripa Escamilla
General Director of Development and Economic Studies, National
Banking and Securities Commission
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